37 posts tagged “3g”
It is more possible to become a stable, low-growth market. Therefore, it's no use being hasty.
[+] Will the advent of 3G lead to a reshuffle of WAP market?
Despite continuous setbacks since 2000, telecom operators have never stopped efforts in the mobile Internet market. Theoretically, Moternet, the WAP portal of the largest mobile operator in the world, China Mobile should have the heaviest traffic volume in the world. After all, it has such a huge subscriber base. This, however, is not the reality.
From an iResearch report, Handset-enabled Internet Activities in China in 2008, we can see that Sina, Baidu and Tencent are among the most visited WAP sites in China. There are even a few independent 3G WAP portals. Thanks to their huge PC-based user bases, traditional Internet players seem to have a chance to challenge telecom operators.
Will the advent of 3G lead to a reshuffle of the market? Despite the fierce battle for subscribers, New China Mobile, New China Telecom and New China Unicom have not changed their visions of transforming from "communication service providers" into "information service providers". Key to this effort will be WAP. Will other WAP sites score another goal along with the promotion of 3G?
What we might not have understood correctly is the fact that, with the advent of 3G, the WAP market might have a stable and slow growth, instead of a sweeping revolution. Therefore, it's no use being hasty. It seems that, at the present time, the conditions for a sweeping revolution are not yet in place.
[+] The development of the WAP user base is a long-term process
First, if the 3 new operators do not offer substantially lower WAP rates, there would be no momentum for WAP users to upgrade to 3G, as no major change is expected to the contents offered by WAP sites. There might be more video and mobile TV services, but the key to the acceptance of users is still the fee rate.
The problem is that only telecom operators could decide the fee rates. Other Internet players have no say in it. In view of the current competition picture, the operators are expected to cut 3G WAP fee rates to some extent. But as I said, only substantial cut in voice fee rates could significantly increase the 3G user base, which is essential for a sharp increase in 3G WAP user base.
Secondly, does a substantial increase of 3G user base mean the same for WAP user base? Experience of telecom operators indicates that a large portion of the first 3G mobile phone subscribers would be WAP users of the 2G time. In other words, as a 2G WAP user becomes 3G WAP user, there would be no increase in the total WAP user number in the market.
In the long term, with intensive 3G promotion efforts of operators, all users will eventually give up 2G (whether voluntarily or forced to do so). The process, however, might not be as fast as you and I have thought. Considering the WAP service, which might be offered as an accessory service, the development of the WAP market could be even slower. The key to the speed of growth is the fee rate, not the number of Gs.
[+] The pain in business models
Why have telecom operators not been able to make good WAP sites? Based on my 5 years of experience in an operator, I could see that the root of the problem is their business models. For telecom operators, there's no free service. Every service should generate revenue, which ideally should be collected from end-users with phone bills. One dollar from each user would add up to an amazingly large amount for the hundreds of millions of income.
WAP services are duplicates of those of the Internet, whose basic business model is to offer free service and gain revenue from advertising. Sharp conflicts are expected for the business model transformation, not to mention the difficulty of changing the mindset of staff in a short time. Telecom operators need to regard themselves as media players before establishing ad departments to gain ad revenue. For them, that's too much.
This business model would have nothing to do with the number of Gs. For WAP, if the business model were transformed to that of media in the 2G time, Monternet could have done it very well even without 3G. Now we are back to the basic question: which is scored "better", higher ARPU or advertising income? If the former, there will not be any change.
It does not mean that telecom operators have to give up fee-based music or image download services, which are, in fact, the revenue sources of the traditional Internet companies, too. Yet, if operators cannot think of anything else, their business growth would be limited. For example, Nokia is seeking cooperation with telecom operators even as it has its own advertising network.
Why didn't operators make the proposal first? Because they are still using the old mindsets. Any business you don't do, somebody else in the business chain would do. Nokia Advertising Network is a manifestation of the company's resolution to transit from the manufacturing industry to the service (particularly the Internet service) industry. Do New China Mobile, New China Unicom and New China Telecom have the same resolution?
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Prev : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (7) The Pricing of 3G Value-added Services
- Today in History
New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (8) WAP Sector Is Slowing Down - 2008/08/10
PDA in Siege (1) The Attack of Notebooks - 2004/08/15
3G value-added services will be cheap, but not so cheap as you have expected.
[+] The pricing of video phone service
As a result of the fierce battle for subscribers between operators, 3G value-added services eventually become a secondary role. In the long-term, however, mobile subscribers will gradually accept the services and use them more than they did in the 2G time. In fact, subscribers first switch to 3G because of attractive voice fee rates. Then they begin to use more value-added services because of faster Internet access speed.
Generally speaking, the most talked-about 3G services include video phone and streaming media. With video phone, you will be able to see the one you are calling. Of course, you can also dial a number to watch a live broadcasting program. Streaming media, on the other hand, enables users to watch audio/video programs via the Internet, mostly by logging onto portals of operators with handsets.
Voice service, video phone and streaming media, how should the three services be appropriately priced? First, as video phone consumes 4 times of bandwidth than general voice calls do, should it be 4 times as expensive? The answer is no, because 4 times is pretty scaring. Most operators offer rates ranging between 1.2 to 1.5 times.
Due to privacy and courtesy concerns, video phone is rarely used. Some people argue that operators should offer lower rates to increase use of video phone services. The fact is, however, low price is probably not sufficient to eliminate the privacy concern. Operators even believe there are reasons you have to use video phone (e.g., your wife requires you to). Is there any other chance of earning such easy money?
[+] The pricing for streaming media
Streaming media service, which enables mobile TV and movies, has been in a dilemma of whether to charge by traffic volume (e.g., RMB X for watching Y mega bytes per month) or by service time (e.g., RMB X for Y hours per month). Eventually, all operators chose service time-based fee rate models.
As most users are still not accustomed to traffic based models, while charging by service time also seems weird (nobody pays TV bills by minutes), the best solution would be monthly packages without time or traffic volume limit. Fearing that users might turn on their handsets 24 hours a day, which would result in considerable waste of wireless network resources, most operators dare not choose the solution.
If they choose to charge by service time, how much per minute would be appropriate? Streaming media service usually consumes twice bandwidth as much as video call does. Nevertheless, I suggest its fee rate be set similar to, or even lower than that of general voice calls. As streaming media service is delivered through IP-based packet-switched network, it could use network resources more effectively than video phone, allowing larger bandwidth for users.
That billing model encourages the use of streaming media to improve the efficiency of the network resources of operators. A challenge for operators is that they have to collect payments for content providers, which would increase the total cost of users. However, that seems to be a problem without solution, because content providers need to be paid, too.
[+] WAP monthly package and the pricing for mobile Internet access
In my view, WAP, the service that has been available since the 2G time is more profitable than mobile TV, which is wildly betted on because of the Olympic Games. Some operators have already offered WAP monthly packages without traffic volume limit. With the advent of 3G, they now face a problem: whether to raise or lower the package rates?
As the costs of operators are based on traffic volumes and 3G, with higher speed, will generate far larger WAP volumes than 2G, maintaining the monthly packages does not seem to be a good deal. However, in order to encourage 3G subscribers to use WAP services, it makes no sense to raise the price. But operators do not want to cut price. Eventually, the fee rates are usually kept at the same level of the 2G services.
As to the monthly mobile Internet access packages (via computers) for current China Unicom's CDMA network, no substantial change is expected because the speed of 3G service remains low (384k for WCDMA). However, as 3G has just been launched in mainland China, it would be well equivalent to the level of 3.5G (HSDPA) right from the beginning. As a result, the fee charging model would change.
For example, there might be packages of RMB X/month for the speed of 128k and RMB Y/month for 256k. Such a pricing model is similar to that of ADSL. Theoretically, the peak rate of HSDPA could be up to 14.4M (it is reported that 3.6M Internet access services would be available soon in Taiwan). Therefore, it is possible to introduce different fee rates for different speed.
[+] The fee rate of value-added services is not the key to attract subscribers
Why operators are so reluctant to cut fee rates of 3G value-added services? Because in the fight for subscribers, they have already cut prices of general voice calls. How do they compensate the loss? Through the above value-added services, of course. Will the value-added service fee rate level affect their subscriber base? Basically not. Then why not setting the fee rates a little bit higher?
Many consumers would consider switching to operators who offer lower voice rates, not the one who offer lower value-added service fee rates. The pricing of value-added service is not the key for operators to attract subscribers. With this user experience and such a mindset of operators, 3G value-added services will be cheap, but not so cheap as you have expected.
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Prev : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (6) Insight into 3G Price War in Taiwan
Next : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (8) WAP Sector Is Slowing Down
- Today in History
New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (7) The Pricing of 3G Value-added Services - 2008/07/27
New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (6) Insight into 3G Price War in Taiwan - 2008/07/20
From Idea to Business (2) How to Estimate Your Income and Cost? - 2007/07/22
New Era of Online Advertising (2) from Exposure to Deal - 2006/07/23
Ultimate Mobile Device (5) Universal User Experience - 2005/07/24
Operators always seek to avoid direct discount.
[+] The 3G war in Taiwan started 5 years ago.
In the previous sessions, I envisioned the post-restructuring 3G fee rate war in mainland China, and provided suggestions on the offensive and defensive strategies for operators. However, as those are just general discussions, it is hard for ordinary people to understand the remarkable aspects of the strategies. Now let's forget about New China Telecom, New China Mobile and New China Unicom, and take a look at the 3G price war that has been ongoing in Taiwan for 5 years.
Taiwan is a place with a GSM penetration rate higher than 100%. In other words, it has more GSM phone numbers than its entire population. Thanks to white hot competitions in the market, the public has been well educated about the "on-net" and "off-net" fee rates. Calls between subscribers of the same operator are entitled to 50% off "on-net fee rates".
Just take a look at the fee rate lists of operators in Taiwan, and you will see this is an inherent logic of their billing practice. As a result, the larger an operator is, the more powerful its ability to attract new and retain existing subscribers. The public knows that, for example, being a subscriber of Chunghwa Telecom, you have better chance of calling somebody who happens to be a subscriber of the same operator and being entitled to preferential (on-net) fee rates.
At the beginning, emerging operators were not able to take a bite from the existing subscriber bases of the "Big 3", i.e., Chunghwa Telecom, Far Eastone Telecom and Taiwan Mobile. The first attack was launched by Taiwan's first 3G operator: Asia Pacific Broadband Wireless Communications Inc. (APBW) In July 2003, APBW launched its value-added brand QMA and two expensive 3G handset models, believing that the first 3G subscribers would arrive soon for its rich portfolio of applications.
[+] Free calls for on-net subscribers
It was not long before APBW found that its 3G vision was a beautiful mistake. Unable to achieve its sales target with expensive handsets and value-added services, the operator soon started its phase-II operation. With free handsets and a stunning offer of "free calls between on-net subscribers", it triggered a price war. Free on-net calls meant that calls between any two 3G subscribers of APBW were free of charge.
The bloody price war did not trap the Big 3, which, as public companies, could not stand the consequent ugly finance statements. In addition, with strong brands, they did not feel the need of an immediate response. Many lovers and students joined the subscriber base of APBW in couple for the free on-net calls. They turned out to be the first subscribers of APBW.
The Big 3 seemed to be so confident that they waited until the end of 2005 to launch their own 3G services. Their strategies were simple: just regarding 3G as a value-added service of 2G. They offered similar fee rates for 3G, except for the mobile Internet service. Up until then, there had not been an all-out 3G price war, as existing operators had been defensive, instead of offensive in the 3G market.
In December 2005, a new 3G operator, VIBO Telecom launched its business operation. Like APBW, VIBO Telecom tried to build its subscribe base from scratch. With lessons learned from APBW, VIBO Telecom did not expect too much from value-added 3G services. Instead, it posed for a price war right from the beginning by offering a package "Everybody On-net".
[+] Same fee rates for on-net and off-net calls
"Everybody On-net" was just the opposite of free on-net calls. The following are a few examples of the differences:
General 3G: NTD X/second for off-net calls and NTD 0.5X/second for on-net calls (like the case of 2G);
APBW: NTD X/second for off-net calls, free of charge for on-net calls
VIBO Telecom: NTD 0.5X/second for off-net calls, NTD 0.5X/second for on-net calls (the same price for on-net and off-net calls, "uniform rates")
As mobile subscribers in Taiwan tended to believe that using services of major operators means better chance of enjoying the 50% discount on-net rates, "Everybody On-net" was actually an attempt to tell consumers that, with VIBO Telecom, they could have 50% discount rates for both on-net and off-net calls. As a matter of fact, VIBO Telecom's price war was to offer 50% discount for off-net fee rates.
"Everybody On-net" led to the counterattack from the Big 3. The first to respond was Taiwan Mobile, which offered a "Local Life" package, dividing Taiwan into 5 regions. Calls within each region were entitled to uniform fee rates similar to those of VIBO Telecom. However, out of the selected region, the cost of communication would rise sharply.
It was really a smart action. It squeezed VIBO Telecom out of the spot light of "uniform rates" without too much compromise in actual fee rates. The region-specific preferential rate package was not as lethal as the 50% discount of VIBO Telecom. However, the strong brand of Taiwan Mobile helped to prevent its subscribers from switching to VIBO Telecom.
[+] Big brands sat tight
For Taiwan Mobile, it was a successful defense. For APBW, however, it was an alert. It followed suit immediately by launching the brand new "Wonder 4" package, ,which, like that of Taiwan Mobile, divided Taiwan into just 4 regions, and offered lower rates than "Local Life". In this package, on-net calls were no longer free. It gave APBW a chance to get rid of the double-edged sword of free on-net calls.
By far the 3G price war really begun, only Far Eastone Telecom and Chunghwa Telecom still sat tight. Instead of introducing new 3G packages, Far Eastone Telecom offered "get one free minute for each minute of on-net calls" promotion for the its existing package. In other words, it was another 50% off based on the existing 50% discount rate.
Far Eastone Telecom promotion: NTD X/second for off-net calls, NTD 0.25X/second (roughly) for on-net calls.
In face of deep cuts in off-net fee rates by rivals, Far Eastone Telecom chose to increase discount for its on-net rates to consolidate its subscriber base. Chunghwa Telecom launched an intensive TV advertising campaign for its F2 (Friend and Family) package, which offered ultra-low rates for calls between each group of 10 mobile subscribers and 6 local fixed line subscribers. Leveraging its advantages in the local phone market, Chunghwa Telecom consolidated its subscriber base, while responding to the 3G price war in a roundabout way.
It is not until lately that Chunghwa Telecom eventually joins the price war by introducing "uniform fee rates for on-net and off-net calls". Yet it has been 3 years since VIBO Telecom triggered the price war, it is true that market leaders are hurt by the proposition of VIBO Telecom. However, with strong brands, they can afford to be the last ones to join the price war.
[+] Being cheap is just an excuse
Aren't we talking about 3G? How comes that price war takes the place of value-added services as the prime role? As I have said, regarding value-added services as the prime role of 3G is a beautiful mistake. The fact is value-added services are only an excuse for operators to avoid price wars. Whether in Taiwan or in mainland China, 3G price wars are inevitable, so long as price killers exist in the market.
In addition, operators are always seeking ways to avoid direct discounts. For them, the best solution is to make consumers feel an offering is cheap, which is actually not. "Being cheap is just an excuse". This is what I have learned from my experience in designing the "Everybody On-net" package at VIBO Telecom and the consequent price war. Consumers will never know the real planning of the operators behind the fee rates.
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Prev : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (5) Fee Rates of 3G Services
- Today in History
New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (6) Insight into 3G Price War in Taiwan - 2008/07/20
From Idea to Business (2) How to Estimate Your Income and Cost? - 2007/07/22
New Era of Online Advertising (2) from Exposure to Deal - 2006/07/23
Ultimate Mobile Device (5) Universal User Experience - 2005/07/24
The key of the attack and defense between operators is the fee rate.
[+] Fee rates reflect the mindsets of operators
Telecom services are basic services. The prime goods involved are "fee rates" (and "terminals" too). Selling communication services is like selling bottled water. It is difficult to target at the right market segment. Why do consumers have brand preference even when they cannot tell the difference between the tastes of bottled water? Since any operator can ensure uninterrupted communication, why do consumers prefer specific brands?
Players offering homogeneous products would be trapped into an endless price war, which would eventually erode the profit margin of everybody, if they do not differentiate their brands and fee rates. So far, few researches on the telecom restructuring mention the price competition strategy. Fortunately, I have the experience of working at a 3G mobile operator as the one in charge of service package pricing. Therefore, I do have something to share with my readers.
The first challenge in the post-restructuring 3G market is to attract subscribers of others while ensuring successful migration of the existing customer base. The key is the fee rate. As is shown in the following chart, operators adopting strategy D tend to have strong brands. Therefore, their 3G fee rates would be at the same level of 2G and no discount is expected.
Such operators would choose to gradually migrate their 2G subscribers to the 3G network. With the same voice fee rates for both 3G and 2G services, the migration will not reduce their revenue. However, why should consumers switch to 3G if there's no discount? Do you really believe that the "rich portfolio of value-added 3G services" is the cause?
[+] No price cut v.s. deep price cut
In fact, only a small number of people would switch to 3G for value-added services. For the vast majority, they neither know nor care about what 3G is. But they will consider anything "that's cheaper". "Price cut" is capable of boosting sales without having to explain to the customer what 3G is.
Operators adopting strategy D have enough confidence that their subscribers will not betray them for lower rates. Therefore, they are patient enough to sell 3G as value-added services of 2G. Nevertheless, they will need to give the subscribers something real. So they begin to cut the prices for mobile Internet services deeply to cater for those who have switched to 3G really for value-added services.
It seems that only New China Mobile has the ability to adopt such a strategy. However, New China Unicom and New China Telecom are waiting to launch a price war. For them, strategy B is milder and worth trying. However, the real price killer is strategy A. Low 3G rate packages plus simple, affordable handsets, seem to be ready to sweep across the market.
Anyone who triggers a price war would get hurt, too. At least with its own 2G subscribers flooding into 3G, its revenue would decrease. However, with its CDMA, New China Telecom doesn't have to worry, for its existing PHS service is cheap enough. If New China Telecom's 3G fee rates could be as low as that of PHS, it would be powerful enough to drive all rivals out of the market.
[+] Ways to cut price
Direct discount, e.g., the offering of a 3G rate based on the discount of a 2G rate, is the least desirable way for a price cut. Powerful as it is, there's no tactics to say. Imagine this: how about 50% off for calls between 3G users of New China Unicom? As communication between subscribers of the same operator consumes only internal resources and does not involve settlement with other operators. This would be a useful and low-cost way.
It would enable New China Unicom to maintain 2G fee rates for 3G services, while offering 50% off for communication between its 3G subscribers. In addition, it would attract consumers in couples or in groups. For example, lovers or family members would switch to the service together to benefit from the 50% off discount. It enables operators to build up their customer bases fast.
You might want to ask: "aren't lovers' or family packages very common in today's market?" The fact is most packages available in the market require the payment of an additional fee monthly. What I mean, however, is automatic availability without the need to pay for an additional package. The practice, which offers different fee rates for "on-net" and "off-net" calls and favorable rates for the former, has been popular around the world for years. But it has never appeared in China. For example:
A 2G subscriber of New China Unicom calls a 2G subscriber of New China Mobile (off-net): RMB X/second;
A 2G subscriber of New China Unicom calls a 3G subscriber of New China Mobile (off-net): RMB X/second;
A 3G subscriber of New China Unicom calls a 2G subscriber of New China Mobile (off-net): RMB X/second;
A 3G subscriber of New China Unicom calls a 3G subscriber of New China Mobile (off-net): RMB X/second;
A 3G subscriber of New China Unicom calls another 3G subscriber of New China Unicom (on-net): RMB 0.5X/second;
A 3G subscriber of New China Unicom calls a 2G subscriber of New China Unicom (on-net): RMB 0.5X/second;
The above fee rates would have a number of results. 1) It would attract groups of subscribers of other operators to use the 3G services of New China Unicom to benefit from its favorable rates; 2) existing 2G subscribers of New China Unicom will speed up their migration to 3G for the favorable rates, without causing substantial loss to the revenue of the operator. In fact, if it is New China Mobile that adopts the above practice, the result would be even more stunning, as it has a formidable customer base. The problem is New China Mobile might think it is an unnecessary act.
Maybe you would ask: "why 50% off instead of 20% off?" Mainly because 50% off is more impressive.
What if New China Unicom and New China Telecom both use the same weapon? How would New China Mobile respond? It could simply offer 50% off for calls between its 3G and 2G subscribers, while maintaining the rates for other services. It would enable faster migration of existing 2G subscribers to 3G, and allow the operator to respond calmly to the price war waged by rivals.
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Prev : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (4) Dealing with Existing Subscribers is Key Next : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (6) Insight into 3G Price War in Taiwan
- Today in History
New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (5) Fee Rates of 3G Services - 2008/07/13
From Idea to Business (1) How to Estimate Your User Number? - 2007/07/15
New Era of Online Advertising (1) from Media to Channels - 2006/07/16
Ultimate Mobile Device (4) Email Service Anywhere Anytime - 2005/07/10
As a matter of fact, each of these operators has more than 100 million subscribers to deal with.
[+] Are there bystanders in the 3G market?
One interesting question: is it possible that, having obtained their 3G licenses, the 3 new operators, i.e., New China Mobile, New China Telecom and New China Unicom all choose to postpone the launch of their 3G services, and wait for the response of the market? After all, migrating existing GSM or CDMA or PHS subscribers to 3G proves to be a huge workload, and might trigger a price war if not dealt properly.
In April 2007, I analyzed 4 possible market accessing strategies of 3G operators with a chart titled "Market Strategies of 3G Operators". As a matter of fact, each of these 4 strategies has been used by telecom operators around the world. Which is the best depends on the competition situation among local telecom operators, as well as standards they adopt.
Most operators planning to postpone the launch of 3G services would adopt strategy C, i.e., starting by providing internet access service only. With base stations mostly located in cities, these operators primarily sell PC data cards to business people to enable Internet accessing for notebooks.In suburb regions, where 3G signal is not available, services will automatically roam to the original GSM network. So the operators will not provide 3G mobile phone and voice services in the initial stage.
Operators adopting this strategy have a number of common identities: 1) they are market leaders with strong brands, and not afraid of rival operators trying to snap market shares away from them with 3G services. 2) Their 3G infrastructure development tends to be slow, with signals capable of covering only urban areas at the beginning. Business people do have requirements for mobile internet, but they care even more about the quality of voice communication. Therefore, the limit signal coverage for the voice service in the initial stage would offend them.
[+] Maybe everybody is a bystander
The one that's most likely to adopt the above tactics is New China Mobile. In view of the heavy workload of migrating hundreds of millions of subscribers to TD-SCDMA, and the possibility of revenue decline, it pays to be careful. Anyway, nobody has experience in TD-SCDMA. With confidence in the brand, many subscribers would rather wait for New China Mobile's 3G services than switch to other operators.
Therefore, New China Mobile might well be a bystander at the initial stage. Although 3G is a more advanced technology, it is hard for ordinary consumers to tell the difference from 2G (I have a 3G phone myself, but I use it only to make phone calls and send/receive short messages). Therefore, it would be hard to persuade them to switch to 3G in the initial stage.
Should other operators take the advantage of the time window in the 3G voice market left by New China Mobile to introduce their own services? Should they launch attacks with 3G systems and infrastructures that are more mature and easier to deploy, as well as 3G handsets and more affordable fee rates? Or should they join New China Mobile to adopt strategy C and be a bystander in the initial stage too?
There's one factor they must consider when selecting their competition strategies: where will their 3G subscribers come from? In our view, the 3G subscribers will come from: 1) their own 2G customer base; 2) the 2G customer bases of other operators; and 3) people who have never used a handset. The experience of 3G operators in Japan indicates that, for any 3G operator, most of the 3G subscribers would come from its own 2G customer base, with only a small portion from rival operators.
[+] The speed and the fee rates are the key
If operators do intend to migrate their 2G customer bases to 3G, there would be a peaceful market in the initial stage. As each operator is engaged in migrating its own 2G subscribers to 3G, no one would bother to launch an attack before it has had a strong foothold in the market.
As a matter of fact, each of these operators has more than 100 million subscribers to deal with. The one who completes all this first would take the lead in launching an attack. Therefore, the key to success would be speed, nothing else. Despite the strong brand of New China Mobile, which allows it the luxury of more waiting time, subscribers are realistic and impatient. They would switch to any other operator that offers the most favorable terms.
To retain existing subscribes and launch an attack toward other operators, the fee rate packages for voice services would be a powerful weapon. The advent of 3G has led to the emergence of a number of call modes: including 3G-to-3G and 3G-to-2G. As there are 3 different systems for both 3G and 2G, the situation could become more complicated. For example, a 3G subscriber of New China Telecom would call a 2G subscriber of New China Unicom.
With such a complexity, a compelling fee rate package would be helpful to retain and migrate existing subscribers while attracting new subscribers from other operators. As to whether it would reduce the revenue of the operator, there's no guarantee. Anyway, 3G is not something intended to help operators earn more.
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Prev : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (3) Who's Gonna Be the Price Killer? Next : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (5) Fee Rates of 3G Services
- Today in History
New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (4) Dealing with Existing Subscribers is Key - 2008/07/06
Ultimate Mobile Device (3) Video, Storage, Copyright Management - 2005/07/03
There is only one price killer in the market.
[+] New China Unicom has had a good start
Through the restructuring, China Unicom finally is able to get rid of its long-time burden, the CDMA network. With both the GSM network and the CDMA network, it has had troubles in operating costs and branding. Even its dual-mode phones, which boasts "duel network standby" arouses skeptics among the consumers. If one network is good enough, why should I have two networks?
In fact, for operators, upgrading either CDMA or GSM to 3G would be easier and more cost-effective than building a TD-SCDMA network from scratch. Particularly, operators of the first two modes around the world have mature experience in business operations, the key is to make oneself focused on one thing. In terms of the extent of easiness for upgrading to 3G, getting rid of either the GSM network or the CDMA network would be an intelligent choice.
According to the latest data, as of June, 2008, China Unicom had 120 million GSM subscribers, and a much smaller CDMA user base: only 40 million. For the post-restructuring New China Unicom, which is posed for the 3G market, getting rid of the CDMA network is not a big loss anyway. If it were the GSM network that's split off, New China Unicom would have big trouble in attracting new subscribers in the future.
New China Unicom could easily upgrade existing GSM to WCDMA. In addition, there are numerous handset models available around the world for the standard. What's more, today, WCDMA has stepped into 3.5G, i.e., HSDPA, which enables download speed several times faster than the original target of 384k.In Taiwan, operators have even launched HSUPA, which offers faster uploading speed to enable the uploading and sharing of images and videos.
[+] The hot potato of New China Telecom
In spite of a much smaller customer base, the above technical infrastructures and the 120 million GSM subscribers make New China Unicom a respectful rival of New China Mobile, so long as it could develop and execute correct strategies in the 3G time. With TD-SCDMA, New China Mobile would carry the burden for a while, which might be an opportunity for other operators.
New China Telecom, the operator based on the existing China Telecom and part of China Unicom, would have two major assets, i.e., the 40 million CDMA customer base and the 50 million PHS customer base. However, it is a well-known fact that the PHS customer base has been shrinking each year. Incapable of upgrading directly to CDMA, PHS is feeling the pressure of market competition.
In addition, with its original market position as mobile local phone service, PHS has been offered at a low fee rate since its introduction. To persuade existing PHS subscribers to switch to CDMA, New China Telecom will have to compromise its fee rates. In addition, there's the problem of changing PHS phones with more expensive CDMA handsets. Therefore, the compromise would involve not only the fee rates, but also the entire handset packages.
The key is to migrate existing PHS subscribers to CDMA. The problem is: will the discount rate package be available to the existing 40 million CDMA subscribers? If not, won't they be hurt? If yes, doesn't that mean a decrease of revenue from the existing CDMA subscribers? That's the dilemma.
[+] Vying to be the price killer
If New China Telecom hasn't made up its mind and continues to depend on landline-bound packages for building its CDMA customer base, the result won't be surprising, in which case, price cut would be inevitable. In addition, any price killer would have only one chance. If it cannot be a hit in the market in the first time, any follow-on price cut would be useless.
If New China Telecom doesn't use the weapon of "price cut", it will be used by New China Unicom. By then, there would be no way out for New China Telecom, for there could be only one price killer in the market. Maybe we want to ask: "why should both operators use price cut in market competition? Why can't they target at high-end business people instead?"
It depends on a few factors. First, how fast could New China Mobile launch its TD-SCDMA services? With the leading-edge brand of New China Mobile in services targeted at business people, it is not easy for the other two operators to compete. The only chance for them would be to build their own networks fast enough to seize the business people market before the launch of TD-SCDMA by New China Mobile.
Second, it is impossible to beat New China Mobile's brand among the business people in a short period of time. Sooner or later, TD-SCDMA would catch up. Therefore, for New China Telecom and New China Unicom, price cut is only a matter of time. Particularly, if New China Telecom falls behind New China Unicom in offering a price cut, it would be difficult to launch follow-on marketing programs. Since a price cut is inevitable, why not taking it up earlier as a weapon?
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Prev : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (2) Opportunities and Burdens for New China Mobile
- Today in History
New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (3) Who's Gonna Be the Price Killer? - 2008/06/29
New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (2) Opportunities and Burdens for New China Mobile - 2008/06/22
Web 2.0 Think Again (5) Unearth the Value of "People" - 2007/06/24
Ultimate Mobile Device (2) Competition of Handheld Game Console - 2005/06/26
Would existing GSM subscribers be its assets or liabilities?
[+] New China Mobile as the forerunner
In a winner-takes-all market, the forerunner would have considerable leading edge. The New China Mobile with its TD-SCDMA, the New China Unicom with its WCDMA and the new China Telecom with its CDMA2000, which is going to be the forerunner? The bargaining for mergers between operators will last for some time, but the one who completes the merger first might not end up being the forerunner.
Yesterday, I was surprised to see a 3G ad of China Mobile on a Focus Media LCD in an office building in Shanghai. The ad has two implications: 1) 3G video phone is really cool; and 2) at the end of the ad, it is mentioned that TD-SCDMA is being tested, implying that it will be launched soon. The ad indicates that China Mobile is taking the lead.
The ad gives me a few inspirations. First, telecom operators around the world have a common idea in mind when they launch their 3G services: "video phone is a selling point." It seems that Chinese operators are no difference (but they do not know, as a matter of fact, consumers resist the service). The 3G war once waged among telecom operators in Taiwan seems to be about to start once again in the mainland.
Second, it seems that TD-SCDMA would be the last 3G version worldwide. Other versions, including WCDMA and CDMA2000, have been in commercial operation for years and very mature by now. The 3G ad of China Mobile seems to be a forerunner. However, when they could introduce compelling TD-SCDMA offerings is another thing.
[+] New China Mobile faces the same challenges that Hutchison once did
Hutchison is the 3G forerunner worldwide. When Mr. Li Ka-shing tried to develop Three, the telecom operator in Europe, he encountered a lot of challenges from the very beginning. First, with only 3 cell phone models, Three offered consumers very limited choices. We have to admit that consumers need very simple reasons to buy things. Cell phones with appealing appearances are a big reason for switching to 3G. Limited choices would affect sales.
In addition, its initial market positioning toward business people was another problem. Among the 3 models, one was focused on the video phone function, and another one on the email feature. While capable of satisfying some of the requirements, these phones ignored the most fundamental requirement of the business people "making phone calls successfully". As a new entrant, WCDMA had only limited coverage. That means there were a lot of places where its signals could not reach.
In addition to the coverage of signals, there was also the problem of the compatibility between cell phones and telecom networks. Although both telecom equipment suppliers and cell phone manufacturers complied with standards, it was the first time for the two to collide head on in the business environment. Three's cell phone supplier NEC sent a team to Europe dedicatedly to assist Three to adjust the cell phones in line with the 3G networks.
The clumsy process resulted in customer complaints and damage to the Three brand. As TD-SCDMA has been away from the public sight before, its business operation ability is much doubted. Assuming the mission of promoting the Chinese standard, New China Mobile might become the last operator to launch 3G. Therefore, it is necessary to learn from existing experience and lessons, so as to avoid mistakes of other operators.
[+] Would existing GSM subscribers be its assets or liabilities?
At the new start line, do the 3 operators each carry a burden on its back? The GSM customer base of New China Mobile is both an asset and a liability. It is an asset because New China Mobile could attract those with higher value among the existing customers to become its 3G subscribers. New China Mobile has undoubted edge to promote 3G at its own existing outlets.
On the other hand, it is a liability because discounted rates will have to be offered to attract existing subscribers to use 3G services. Of course, it would be better to attract subscribers of other operators. However, if its 3G subscribers are derived from the existing GSM customer base, the total revenue would decrease. In general, with the launch of 3G, the operator would earn less, instead of more.
In summary, New China Mobile would face 3 challenges: 1) how to attract more cell phone manufacturers to make TD-SCDMA phones, ideally with enough models to cover different price levels; 2) how to maintain the existing GSM rates while attracting more users of 3G; 3) how to ensure the quality of 3G calls, i.e., how to ensure the roaming of the calls to its GSM network in areas beyond the reach of TD-SCDMA signals.
Appealing as they are, other value-added services, such as mobile Internet, won't be available before overcoming the above challenges. The much hated video phone might be only a selling point for advertising. At the late stage of the 3G war, operators around the world are no longer boasting about their value-added services. Instead, they begin to focus on voice fee rate discounts.
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Prev : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (1) Winner Takes All Next : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (3) Who's Gonna Be the Price Killer?
- Today in History
New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (3) Who's Gonna Be the Price Killer? - 2008/06/29
New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (2) Opportunities and Burdens for New China Mobile - 2008/06/22
Web 2.0 Think Again (5) Unearth the Value of "People" - 2007/06/24
Ultimate Mobile Device (2) Competition of Handheld Game Console - 2005/06/26
There might be 2 big and 1 small, or 1 big and 2 small operators.
[+] 3G might have 3 versions.
On May 24, 2008, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China jointly published Notice on Deepening Telecom Structural Reform. The hottest topic it brought was the restructuring of the nation's telecom industry. The notice announced the attitude of the Chinese government toward 3G. For the operators, any action is better than no action at all.
In China, 3G is no longer a matter of "to have or not to have". Rather, it's about making sure to build it first and seeing how to do it next. The latest round of restructuring highlights the support of the government to the Chinese version of 3G: TD-SCDMA. Prior to that, there were many critics towards 3G and even those arguing for a direct leap to 4G. Now, none of these matters. The operators are posed for a massive merger. Following that would be the issuance of 3G licenses and a new round of infrastructure development. Then, 3G comes.
As a pioneer with 4 years of experience in 3G operation, I have written a lot about the new landscape in the 3G market. As a matter of fact, with the delay of 3G license issuance, Chinese telecom operators have the chance to learn the 3G operation experience from their international peers. As a result, the expectation for 3G, which was once irrationally eager, is getting gradually rational.
The restructuring will turn the operators into 3 powers: 1) China Mobile + China Tietong, let's call it "New China Mobile" for the time being; 2) China Unicom's GSM Network + China Netcom, "New China Unicom"; and 3) China Telecom + China Unicom's CDMA Network + China Satcom, "New China Telecom". Specifically New China Mobile is expected to adopt TD-SCDMA as its 3G version, while New China Unicom will adopt WCDMA and New China Telecom CDMA2000.
[+] Subscribers face bigger barriers for changing network in the 3G time
The restructuring plan seems to have taken care of the interest of each party and each 3G standard fairly. Ideally, a tri-player market structure would facilitate competition and benefit consumers eventually. The fact is, however, to facilitate real market competition, the 3 new operators should use the same version for 3G, for example, TD-SCDMA or WCDMA.
Consumers have to buy a 3G cell phone to be able to use 3G services. Think about this: a consumer who has a New China Unicom's 3G cell phone wishes to switch to the 3G network of New China Mobile. What he needs do is just change his USIM card, instead of buying a new cell phone. If such an easy thing occurs frequently, the operators will have to figure out better ways to cater for their customers, and preventing them from changing network.
Now a subscriber of New China Mobile has a 3G, TD-SCDMA cell phone, and wishes to switch to New China Unicom. The problem is New China Unicom's 3G version is WCDMA. So he has to buy a new cell phone, which is by no means easy. With more functions than 2G devices, 3G phones will not be cheap. The consumer begins to hesitate.
As it is now definite that the 3 new operators will get 3 different 3G licenses, this is sure to happen. To a large extent, it has decided the landscape in the future market: the one who builds its customer base first is expected to retain the customers for a considerably long period of time. No one who has spent so much on a 3G cell phone would so casually switch a network in the immediate future.
[+] Customer base building: winner takes it all
One of the most attractive aspects about 3G is the video phone. Being able to see the person at the other end of the call is a feature that people both love and hate (and that accounts for why it has not been popular anywhere in the world). With the existence of different versions, a person with a WCDMA phone will not be able to call someone with a CDMA 2000 phone. The attractive aspect of 3G, it seems, is not so attractive.
For operators, this is both a challenge and an opportunity. If the new operators could persuade lovers (or mothers and sons) to buy their 3G phones (for video phone communication) at the same time, subscribers would increase by couple. For both parties of a call, no barrier exists for using 3G phones of the same spec to make video phone calls.
The above observation has drastically increased the possibility of "winner takes all" in China's 3G market. The one who builds up its customer base first would establish a leading edge. It was the same situation that once occurred as the result of the competition between China Mobile and China Unicom's CDMA Network. The difference is the new landscape brings everybody back to the start line again. At least it gives us new expectations.
If the 3 new operators end up being equal rivals, it would be the consumers who eventually benefit most. Although under the protection of different versions of 3G, changing network is difficult. There would be a landscape of competition between equally powerful players. However, if the tri-party balance is disturbed, there might be 2 big and 1 small, or 1 big and two small operators.
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Prev : Glimpse into Profit Model of SNS-based Advertising Next : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (2) Opportunities and Burdens for New China Mobile
- Today in History
New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (1) Winner Takes All - 2008/06/08
Web 2.0 Think Again (3) A Reason to "accost" Someone Online - 2007/06/03
If so, telecom operators would be shut out of the mobile TV market.
[+] The past experience of cell phone manufacturers
From the tide of WAP-based Internet accessing in 2000 to the crazy bid for 3G licenses, and then to the bet on MMS for promoting sales of camera phones and music phones that enable music downloading, and finally to 3G phones with audio/video services, cell phone manufacturers have had thrilling experiences over the years.
The world cell phone market started to show signs of saturation in 2000. To maintain their growth, manufacturers had to motivate consumers to replace their phones with newer products. All of the thrilling experiences in the past 7 years seem to be a quest for what really are the selling points. Fortunately, the result so far has been satisfactory.
In summary, there are a few observations:
1)Mobile Internet is a hard-to-handle concept. The key is consumers tend to compare their expectation for mobile Internet with their PC-based Internet experience, which, in most cases, ends up in disappointment, as cell phones are not so easy to handle as PCs. Mobile Internet has been successful in Japan, only because of the low PC penetration rate there.
2)Telecom operators wish that new cell phones be bound with particular services, so that they could benefit from their sales, instead of being un-paid sales reps of the manufacturers. However, it turns out that consumers buy camera phone only because they can use it to take pictures, and anyone seldom uses MMS service.
3) There's no concern for the shortage of content accessing channels. Despite the hot sale of music phones bound with download service offered by telecom operators, most users choose to transmit music from their computers to cell phones, instead of downloading them from the WAP portal provided by telecom operators. Although it is more troublesome, but it is free.
4)3G audio/video services, including IP-based audio/video streaming and video phone, have not brought satisfactory user experience. It is a very simple concept to allow both parties of a phone call to see each other. However, due to privacy concerns, it has not been able to become a killer application.
[+] Telecom operators might be ignored
With the above experience, cell phone manufacturers finally realized that their business is to make and sell handsets. The simpler their products are the better. There's nothing simpler than the concept of mobile TV.
Consumers no longer have to bother whether the TV programs are downloaded from the Internet, nor cell phone manufacturers to care about whether their phones are bound with particular services offered by telecom operators, so long as they free themselves from the troublesome 3G audio/video experience.
In fact, a hi-tech company in mainland China has developed a sort of chip, which can be built in cell phones to receive traditional analog TV signals. In other words, with such a chip, you will be able to watch wireless channel with your cell phone, regardless of its specification or standard.
The only shortcomings are the mobility and fidelity. As analog TV signals are not intended for mobile environments, the fidelity cannot be compared with that of digital programs of mobile TV. However, it would be good for some people, if the programs are played on small-screen cell phones.
In most cases, however, people watch mobile TV on static environments, e.g., bus or subway stations, or in offices. It explains a fact that cell phone manufacturers will be able to sell their products without binding themselves with telecom operators.
The only thing that those manufacturers have to worry about is where programs would be, once new standard-based mobile TV is launched? Will telecom operators become content aggregators as we discussed in the previous section? If not, they'd better establish connections with content providers right away.
[+] Charging or not, it's a matter about the structure of the industry
The high production costs of movie/TV programs turn out to be a big obstacle for traditional value-added service providers to produce contents themselves. Imaginably, a big part of contents for mobile TV will come from traditional TV stations.
An interesting cooperation mode is that after consumers buy a mobile TV-enabling cell phone, they will get a set of passwords from TV program providers. Upon activation, the cell phone will be bound with the passwords to enable watching programs. The fee is charged each month through the phone bill from telecom operators.
That mode is designed for charging fees. If mobile TV programs are offered for free, and program providers depend on ads for their incomes, the passwords and the additional lines in the phone bills of telecom operators would be unnecessary. If so, telecom operators would be shut out of the mobile TV market.
With regard to the mobile TV services, the only way for telecom operators to gain the favor of cell phone manufacturers is to persuade content providers to charge fees, in which case, they would become the largest content aggregators and channels for charging fees. Otherwise, they would be easily abandoned in the game.
In addition to traditional TV stations, will website operators (e.g. Yahoo! and Google), which are gaining influence in the mobile Internet sector be able to get a share in the market? Those players do not have program-producing ability themselves. However, through audio/video content sharing, they will have some opportunities.
Audio/video content sharing sites, such as YouTube, has a lot of interesting programs. In spite of the low fidelity (as most programs are produced by non-professionals, after all), such programs might be good enough for cell phone-sized screens.
Currently, the mobile TV market is still a virgin land for a lot of players, including telecom operators, cell phone manufacturers, traditional TV media and emerging Internet media. The future will be interesting and full of expectations. Eventually the biggest winner will be consumers. The distribution of audio/video contents will be fast and convenient as never seen before.
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Prev : Mobile TV Market (2) the Subtle Role of Telecom Operators
- Today in History
Mobile TV Market (3) Terminal Manufacturers & Content Providers - 2007/12/02
Great Future of Wireless Broadband (4) WiMax, 3G and 4G - 2006/12/03
Internet and Books (1) Dilemma of Online Publishing - 2005/12/04
VoIP (2) Who Depends on Whom - 2004/12/05
VoIP Gives out the First Cry - 2003/12/07
"Killing time" is the core for the development of mobile TV.
[+] Consumers are spending less time watching TV day by day.
Being optimistic about the mobile TV market, chip makers, cell phone manufacturers, telecom operators, media operators and value-added content providers have been making preparations in advance. However, is mobile TV really what consumers want? An unspoken doubt is: will anyone really watch TV on the go?
First of all, a trend is crystal clear. Consumers are spending less time watching TV through TV sets. Statistics show that at least in mainland China and Taiwan, the number of people surfing Internet after 8 p.m. at night are increasing steadily, so is the time spent.
Each person has only limited hours in a day. As more and more people choose to spend their off hours in front of computer screens, the TV audience group would diminish. IPTV has not been successful, largely because it is still trying to bring people back in front of TV screens, ignoring the fact that nowadays people hardly watch TV anymore.
The correct way to attract today's TV audience is to move audio or TV programs onto the screen of computers and cell phones. However, the decrease of the time for watching TV and the increase for using computers do not mean that the hours spent on watching cell phone screens would increase.
Here we have two questions to think about: 1) Consumers' hours on the go are fixed (on their way to work/home, or weekend outdoor trips, etc.), so what are their requirements for TV programs during those hours? 2) Is it possible to stimulate the enthusiasm of consumers for mobile TV even in room?
Will consumers buy if we successfully address the user experience challenges for watching video programs on 3G cell phones, and enable press-and-play, fast and effective channel switching and easy, simple billing?
[+] "Killing time" is the core for the development of mobile TV.
Product managers of mobile TV programs might have been racking their brains for clues about consumer requirements. The fact is they don't have to. What consumers want is just to kill time. It would be so boring at bus or subway stations that consumers would like to have something to watch; they may just want to snatch a little rest during busy office hours to steal a look at the cell phone, or they want to take a look at some important news.
Killing time, by all means, is the most critical application of mobile TV. There's no need for complicated interaction programs. Previously, 3G cell phone-base audio/video programs were so troublesome to operate that the "interaction" eventually turned "killing time" into "killed by time".
"Killing time" is also the key to mobile TV billing. One simple question: how much are you willing to pay for killing time? Currently in Taiwan, cable TV bills are about NTD 600 per month. How much, then, is reasonable for mobile TV? 200? Or 100?
DVB-H-based mobile TV offers one-way broadcasted digital programs, which, in theory, don't have to be received only with cell phones. Special terminal devices would be developed in the future for receiving such wireless digital programs. And there might be USB terminals for computers, too.
If digital TV itself is offered for free, there's no need to bother with which terminal device to use (ideally, of course, it's more convenient to be built in cell phones). In view of the current situation, however, monthly billing modes such as those adopted by the cable TV sector will be considered by operators. Therefore, integrating the fee into cell phone bills seems to be a natural choice.
If so, telecom operators would be put into a very subtle position. They might have nothing to do with mobile TV program provider, or become just a billing solution provider for the later, or even play a role similar to cable TV system operators.
[+] The subtle position of telecom operators in the mobile TV industry
In the first case, where telecom operators have nothing to do with digital TV content providers. TV-enabling cell phones bought by consumers (or other terminal devices) will be able to receive TV programs by design. If the programs need charges, consumers can make payment to TV program provider directly to get user IDs.
To get a simpler picture, just imagine binding a cell phone with a digital TV terminal. Each device functions independently without the interference of the other. If TV program providers want to charge the users, they could choose a number of channels, but would have to print and send the bills themselves.
Program providers can also choose to cooperate with telecom operators, if they do not want such troubles. That leads us to the second case: fee collection through cell phone bills. A more deep cooperation model could make interactive programs together with mobile operators and enable real-time program balloting through GPRS.
Trouble, however, is at door. There would be numerous program providers and TV channels. Say, there might be 5, and a consumer could choose to pay one for the program he watches, but he would not be able to afford all 5 if he wants to watch them all.
Generally speaking, that is not good news to the mobile TV sector. The real solution to maximize the interest of program providers is to build a single platform to enable free switching of channels. Yes, there are always competitions. However, if competitions lead to obstacles for consumers, that's no good to anyone.
More over, consumers have been accustomed to the monthly billing mode of one package for watching over 100 channels, which will not change in a short time. Therefore, a player capable of integrating all programs, which is similar to a cable TV system operator, is highly expected. Who will assume this role? It seems to be telecom operators.
That turns out to be the third case. However, everybody wants to dominate. The TV industry does not want their channels to be controlled by others, while the telecom industry will not give up the opportunity of entering the media market. Ironically, the fate of this scenario depends on whether mobile TV is fee-based or not.
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Prev : Mobile TV Market (1) Cell Phone plus TV, the Dream of Everybody Next : Mobile TV Market (3) Terminal Manufacturers & Content Providers
- Today in History
Mobile TV Market (2) the Subtle Role of Telecom Operators - 2007/11/25
Great Future of Wireless Broadband (3) Scarce Resources - 2006/11/26
Google's Choice (2) Lessons for the Software Giant - 2005/11/20
VoIP (1) It's a Fool Not to Make Telecom Money - 2004/11/28
